Active Directory: the flaw that turns any account into an administrator

CVE-2026-118148 lets an attacker with network credentials escalate privileges in Active Directory. Microsoft rates it critical and a patch is available.

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Active Directory is the system that decides who is who inside a Windows network. That is why CVE-2026-118148 is more serious than its 8.8 suggests: it does not let an outsider in, but it turns a low-privilege account into an account with everything.

Active Directory Domain Services stores users, machines, groups and permissions. It is the service that validates credentials and decides what each account can do. An authorisation flaw there is not a password flaw: it is a crack in the logic that separates a normal user from a domain administrator.

Microsoft released the patch on 10 November, in the November update round, and raised the score to 8.8 after revising the advisory on the 18th. The vulnerability is an incorrect authorisation flaw (CWE-863) in Active Directory Domain Services. An attacker with network access and low-level credentials can elevate privileges without user interaction.

The attack path belongs to an intruder who is already inside. They do not need administrator rights: a valid account and connectivity to the domain controller are enough. From there they send crafted traffic and take advantage of the service failing to check authorisation properly. The result can be an account with more permissions than it should have, up to domain administrator level.

There is no known public exploit and no confirmed exploitation, and it is not in CISA’s KEV catalogue. Microsoft marks exploitation as “more likely” on the latest versions. The absence of attacks does not make it harmless: a compromised domain is the point from which machines, accounts and backups are controlled.

It affects Windows 10 (1607, 1809, 21H2 and 22H2), Windows 11 (23H2, 24H2, 25H2, 26H1 and 26H2) and Windows Server 2016, 2019, 2022 and 2025, including Server Core installations. The fixed versions are the November ones: 10.0.14393.9688, 10.0.17763.9487, 10.0.19044.7846, 10.0.19045.7846, 10.0.20348.5870, 10.0.22631.7711, 10.0.26100.9974, 10.0.26200.9974, 10.0.26300.9974 and 10.0.28000.3501. The KB articles are in Microsoft’s advisory.

The work does not end with Windows Update. Domain controllers must be updated, including Server Core installations, and the accounts with delegated privileges must be reviewed. If a service account or a broad group has administrative rights, the flaw finds its way. The recommendation is the usual one: least privilege, named accounts and auditing of changes to privileged groups.

It is also worth watching the domain controllers’ authentication logs. An exploitation attempt can look like normal traffic from a machine on the network. The difference is the sequence: a low-privilege account starts requesting operations it should not. Without auditing, that signal is lost among thousands of events.

A domain administrator can create accounts, change passwords, read stored secrets and modify policies. They do not need a zero-day for any of that: the system itself gives them the tools. That is why a privilege escalation in AD is treated as a full compromise, even if the attacker entered with a service account.

The patch is applied like any Windows cumulative update, but in a domain the order has to be coordinated. Updating one machine and leaving the domain controller behind does not close the door. Start with the controllers, check the version and repeat the review on machines that do not receive automatic updates.

The CVSS vector reflects the conditions: network access, low privileges and no user interaction, but high attack complexity. That is why it scores 8.8 and not 9.8, and why the practical risk depends on how exposed the domain is.

A domain controller that is not updated keeps the flaw open for every machine that trusts it, even if those machines are patched.

The window is comfortable: the patch has been available since 10 November and there are no signs of exploitation. That does not mean waiting for the first breach. In Active Directory, the difference between a normal account and a domain administrator is often a single authorisation check that was not done properly.